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IN THE

SUPREME COURT
OF THE

STATE OF UTAH
STATE OF UTAH,

Plaintif!-Respondent,
-VS.-

Case No.

PHILLIP COOPER GEORGE and
WILLIAM WADE THOMPSON,
Defendants-Appellants.

12135

BRIEF OF RESPONDENT
STATEMENT OF THE NATURE OF THE CASE
The Appellants, Phillip Cooper George and William
Wade Thompson, appeal from conviction for grand larceny
entered against them in the District Court of the Second
.Jud1c:ial District, in and for Weber County, State of Utah,
the Honorable Charles G. Cowley, _Judge, presiding.
DISPOSITION IN THE LOWER COURT
The appellants were found guilty of grand larceny,
a jury, as charged in the information and were sentenced to the Utah State Prison.
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
Respondent ask this Court to affirm the judgment
Jf the District Court.

1

2

STATEMENT OF FACTS
Appellants were charged in th·.: complaint and information with grand larceny (R. 1, 2). They were specifically
charged with taking, stealing and driving away a pickup
truck and camper from the sales lot of a car dealer in
Ogden, Utah.
Mr. Arave, an employee of the car de::iler,
that he had driven the truck with the camper to
lot where it was to be displayed for sale, and that
up and camper were removed from the lot by
unknown after the business had closed for the
(Tr. 34-43).

testified
the sales
the picksomeone
weekend

A report was submitted to the local police department
stating that a vehicle had been stolen from the car lot.
An officer appeared at the lot pursuant to the report to
make an investigation (Tr. 44). The officer was given
a description of the pickup and camper (Tr. 45).
A bill of sale showing the serial number of the camper
was admitted into evidence (Tr. 40, 42, 58).
A camper having the sar.ie serial number and otherwise being identified as the stolen camper, was found in
Salt Lake City (Tr. 58). The camper, when located in Salt
Lake, was in the possession of Mr. Perkins (Tr. 60-61).
Mr. Perkins testified that he had picked up the camper
from a Mr. Elsbury, pursuant to a request of Mr. Brimhall (Tr. 61). Mr. Brimhall had purchased the camper
from Mr. Elsbury, and Mr. Perkins was delivering it (Tr.

1.
lljl

Hoth appellants were at Elslmrys' when Perkins picked

the camper (Tr. 64).
Elsliui·y

tiu,t the two appellants were on

his premises when the camper was delivered fo him; and

'.id appellant Thompson offored him $100.00 if he found
a buyer for the camper, and that appellant George concurred
in the $100.00 offer (Tr. 142, 143). The camper ·was de-

iin•r_•cl on a bte mo,121 green Chevrolet or GMC Truck.
1Tr.

1R.

1 W); this matches the description of the stolen pickup

(Tr. 37).
Mrs. Elsbury testified that both defendants were at

the Elsbury residence at or about the time the camper was
deliYered, and that after Mrs. Brimhall had tendered the
on behalf of Mr. Brimhall, appellant George handed
the money

to appellant Thompson (Tr. 130, 131).

:\Irs. Brimhall testified that it was she who paid the
money for her husband, and while she was at Elsburys'
place, she saw both appellants (Tr. 114).

1,

(

I

:\Ir. Brimhall testified that after the camper was found
ll1 Perkin's JlOSsession and was impounded by the police,
he tried to g·et his money back. He went to appellant
George's house; George informed Brimhall that the money
would be returned (Tr. 80). Appellant Thompson also told
Brimhall that the money would be returned (Tr. 84).
The appellants neither put witnesses on, nor otherwise
offered any evidence in the case.

4

ARGUl\IENT
POINT I
THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT ERR IN DENYH\G M

PELLANTS'

MOTION

TO

DISMI3S

ON

THE

GROUNDS

THAT THE EVIDENCE WAS INSUFFICIENT TO SUPPORT
YERDICT OF GUILTY, BECAL'SE THE EVIDENCE _
DIRECT AND CIRCUl\ISTA:t\TIAL WAS SUCH TH.IT
REASON ABLE l\IINDS COULD BELIEVE BEYOND A
REASON ABLE DOUBT THAT EACH OF THE
OF LARCENY EXISTED.

Larceny is defined by statute as "the felonious stealing.
taking, carrying, leading or driving away the personal
property of another." Utah Code Ann., § 76-38-1 (1953).
Where the property involved is in excess of $50.00, the
crime is grand larceny. Utah Code Ann., § 76-38-4 (1953).
Regarding the sufficiency of evidence to sustain a
conviction of grand larceny, this Court has ruled that:
"The evidence must be such that reasonable
minds could believe beyond a reasonable doubt that
each of the following elements of larceny existed:
(1) taking and (2) carrying away of the (3) per·
sonal property (valued over $50.00) ( 4) of another
(5) by trespass without the owner's consent (61
with the intent to steal." State v. Shonka, 3
124, 126 (1955).
Appellants assert that a necessary element of grand
larceny is "that the apellants possessed the

Appellants' Brief at 4.
Respondent submits that "[p]roof of larceny does not
require a showing that the accused be in possession of the

5
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The Utah statute does p1·ovide, ho'.'>·ever, that "f p]
ussession of property recently stolen, when the person
j;, 1,ossession fails to make a s:'.tisfactory explanation,
be deemed prima facie evidence of guilt." Utah Code
A.1111., § 76-38-1, (1953). The statute does not requi'.'"e poss,,ss1on as proof of larcrny. "[P]ossession is merely evidl'nce of the taking, \\'hich is an essential element of the
offense." State v. Pacheco, supra, at 150.
The facts clearly show that a truck and camper, each
of which \\'as valued over $50.00, were stolen. (Tr. 34-43).
There is Hot much evidence concerning the disposit10n of the truck, even though there is some (Tr. 140);
but, the record is clear as to the disposition of the camper,
and that both appellants had a great deal to do with the
stolen camper.
Mrs. Elsbury testified that appellant George was
at her home at or about the time the camper was delivered
to the Elsbury residence (Tr. 124), and that both defend;1nts came to the Elsbury place the night before the camper
was sold to the Brimhalls (Tr. 126).
Mr. Elsbury testified that the two appellants were
on h; premises when the camper was delivered; that apµellant Thompson offered him $100.00 if he found a buyer
(Tr. 142), and that appellant George concurred in the
$100.00 offer (Tr. 143).

b

Mrs. Brimhall testified that when she went to [
lrnrys' to pay for the camper,
saw both appellat:
(Tr. 114). She tendered cash because a check would:
be taken (Tr. 72, 110).
Mrs. Elsbury testified that she saw appellant Gei,1
hand money to appellant Thompson (Tr. 130). This
of interest, because appellants would have this Cou·
believe that appellant George ha<l nothing to <lo "''ith t·
money (Appellants' Brief at 7).
Mr. Elsbury received his $100.00 as previously
(Tr. 131).
Mr. Perkins testified that when he picked up
camper to deliver it to Mr. Brimhall, that both appellant:
were at the Elsburys', and that he, Mr. Elsbury, and botl
appellants, put the camper onto his truck (Tr. 64).
After the camper was impounded, Mr. Brimhall ,:tempted to get his $600.00 back. Each of the appellai1t:
said the money would be returned (Tr. 80, 84).
It is not critical to the case at bar that there ,

not more evidence concerning the truck. Where two dii
ferent items are specified in the information, and the e1
dence upholds only the charge with respect to one of then.
a conviction under the information may be sustained anr
way. 52A C.J.S., Larceny § 98 ( 1968).
Thus, where there is sufficient evidence to sho'
larceny with respect to the camper, the conviction shr1u1
be affirmed. However, pursuant to the argument whir
follows. since the truck and camper were a "unit." 1'

sufficient to support :1
tor the theft of
nwy lie suffieient to support the theft. of the other.

dellCL'
t>l!e

111

I:espondent submits that
is S,iLlicie11t evidence
l'ase at ba1· to sustain a co11Yiction of grand larceny.

The evidence is mostly circumstantial, Lut a c:onviction for

larceny
rest upon cireumstantial evidence. "[S] uch
evidence may be just as conclusive or even more so than
<lirect evidence .... " State i·. Laub, 102 U. 402, 407 (1942).
The burden of proof remains upon the prosecutor,
and respondent concedes that circumstantial evidence in
a criminal case may be submitted to the jury only pursuant
to a strict standard. This Court has spoken to this issue
recently:
" [ W] here a conviction is based on circumstantial evidence, the evidence should be looked upon with
caution, and that it must exclude every reasonable
hypothesis except the guilt of defendant. This is
entirely logical, because if the jury believes that
there is a reasonable hypothesis in the evidence consistent with the defendant's innocence, there would
naturally be a reasonable doubt as to his guilt.
Nevertheless, that proposition does not apply to each
circumstance separately, but is a matter within the
prerogative of the jury to determine from all of the
facts and circumstances shown; and if therefrom
they are convinced beyond a reasonable doubt of
the defendant's guilt, it necessarily follows that they
regarded the evidence as excluding every other
reasonable hypothesis. Unless upon our review of
the evidence, and the reasonable inferences fairly
1o he deduced therefrom, it appears that there is no
reasonable basis therein for such a conclusion, we

8
should not overturn the verdict." State
_ _ U.2d _____ (Case No. 11588, 1970).

1·.

Schrui

The circumstances in case at bar taken together reaso[I
ably exclude every reasonable hypothesis that someone othe·
than appellants stole the truck and camper. "[T]he weigr
of the evidence is for the jury, and the Court will not dii
turb the verdict." State l'. Erwin, 101 U. 065, 401 (19111
1

Th8 appellants called no witnesses ;;.nd made no ex
planation as to their association with the disposition of tht
camper. The prosecution, which at all times had the burde:
of proof, did put on several witnesses and presented eH
dence for the jury to consider.
The evidence offered by prosecution was such tha
reasonable minds could believe beyond reasonable <lout·
that appellants committed the crime of grand larceny. Th·
record shows that the camper which appellants were dealir.'
with is the one taken from the Ogden car dealer, and that::
was valued over $50.00. The evidence shows that bot·
appellants had several contacts with the sale of the stoler
camper, and that they took all the money from the sale
except a small fee which they paid to Elsbury for findin,
a buyer. From these direct facts, the elements of larcer,

1

may be inferred.
The case at bar is between the situations where tn·
stolen property is found in defendant's possession, 31;
where the stolen property is not found at all. Under ou
larceny statute cited above, possession shall be deemed prin
facie evidence of guilt, and may be submitted to jury 0
that basis. The Court ruled in State v. Hall, 105 U. 15'.

"i a I defendant may !Je co11neded with a
larceny by circumsbntial evidence, even though the
idt>ntical goods are never found in the defencla11t's posses, ,0 11 or never found at all."
1-·'.l ( J 91:;), that

ruven
1

Ilespo11ckut submits that the case at Lar is tantamount
to a situation \\ he1·e the stolen property is found in defendant's possession; at least it is much stronger than where
the property is not found at all. In any event, regardless
of \\'here the stolen property was situated, all the circumstances put together constituted evidence from which the
jury did properly conclude that appellants were guilty as
charged.
POINT II
THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT ERR IN INSTRUCTING
THE JURY THAT IN ORDER TO CONVICT THE APPELLANTS ON CIRCUMSTANTIAL EVIDENCE, SUCH EVIDENCE i\IUST BE CONSISTENT WITH GUILT AND INt ONSISTENT WITH ANY REASONABLE THEORY OF IN\'OCENCE.

The jury was instructed that before appellants could
be convicted, "you must find from the evidence, beyond a
reasonable doubt, all of the [elements of grand larceny]."
Jury Instruction, No. 6, (R. 7).
The .i ury was further instructed that:
"Every person is presumed innocent until
proved guilty beyond a reasonable doubt. This
presumption attends the defendant through every
stage of the trial, and if possible you should reconcile
the evidence with this presumption, and in case of
a reasonable doubt as to whether his guilt is satis-

10
factorily shown you should acquit the defendant
Jury Im;tructi:on. f..To. 12, (R. 7).
"If, after an entirely fair and impartial cu;.
sideration and comparison of all of the evidence t'
the case, you caa candidly say that you <ire not s;:t 1,
fied of the defendant's guilt, then you haw .
reasonable doubt aad your verdict should be ·rn,
But, if after such consider:ttion of all ti,.
evide11ce, you have an abiding conviction of di,
<lefend;int's guilt, such as you \vould be willinp- t11
act upon in the more weighty and irnporb<d matters relating to your own affairs, then you hare I!"
rensonable doubt and your verdict should be 'guilt('
Jury Instruction, No. 14, (R. 7).
1

The jury was alerted that the "instructions,
numbered separately, should be considered tog--:ther." ./llr1
Instruction. No. 16, (R. 7).
As appellants have pointed out in their brief, the jurr

was instructed concerning circumstantial evidence. A1111rl·
lants' B1·ief. at 11 and 12; Jury Instruction, No. 8, (R. ii.
Respondent submits that the instructions sufficiently an,i
accurately informed the jury.
The .i ury was instructed that in order " [ t Jo conrni
the [appellants l on circumstantial evidence all the facL·
and circumstances must be consistent with each other an,:
with the guilt of the [appellants], and inconsistent with nn
reasonable theory of [appellants'] innocence." ( Emphasii
added.)
The instructions do not state tlrnt appellants are to bf
considered guilty unless the jury finds that the evidenu

11
is Clmsistent with innocence! The i11structions Cll'e in kccpiiig \\'ith the presumption of innocence.

"l T j o .i ustify a conviction on circumstantial
evidence, the facts and circumstances must not only
be entirely consistent with the theory of guilt but
must be inconsistent with any other rational conclusion." People v. Yrig.oyen, 286 P.2d 1, 3 (Cal.
1955).
Respondent submits that .iury instruction No. 8, given
at the trial in case at bar is a pro1)er instruction concerliii1g
ciffnmsLmtial evidence under the rule in State l'. Garcia,
J1 U.2d 67 (1960). The Court does not require any particular language, and does not apply a semantic test. The
l'ourt does require "language which the fury would understand" Id. at 71, and which in effect instructs that in order
to convict on circumstantial evid".)nce, the "circumstances
must reasonably preclude every
hypothesis of
rlefendant's innocence." Id. at 71. (Emphasis added.)
The instruction in case at bar did not contain the phrase
reclude every reasonable hypothesis," but it did contain
11nclerstandable language which had the same effect; to-wit,
tl1e phrase, ''inconsistent with any reasonable theory of
rlefen<hmt's innocence."
: 1

reasonable hy11othesis of appellants' innocence was
1 resented. No reasonable theory consistent with appellants'
innocence was presented. The appellants were in no way
lli'rindicPd by the ·cerdict. The jury was instructed that
.:ppcllants were presumed innocent until proved guilty be1.·cir!d rea.c;o11ahle doubt, and in order to convict upon circum1

stantial evidence such evidence had to be consistent witr
guiit and inconsistent with any reasonable theory of inn1r
cence. The evidence supports the verdict.
If the evidence was not consistent with guilt, ther.

could be no conviction; the jury was so instructed. Even ii
the evideace was consistent with guilt, there could be w
conviction where it was also consistent with any reasona\J!t
theory of innocence; the jury was so instructed. Any rrasonable theory of innocence, supported by the evidence
would require acquittal.
Respondent submits that the instruction was not erroi:eous, but even if it were erroneous that it was not prejudicial. Where there is error, there is not necessarily preju
dicial error. State v. Pappacostas, 17 U.2d 197 ( 1965).
"After hearing an appeal the court must gi1t
judgment without regard to errors or defects whicf.
do not affect the substantial rights of the
If error has been committed, it shall not be presumed to have resulted in prejudice. The court
must be satisfied that it has that effect before it ii
warranted in reversing judgment." Utah Code Ann.
§ 77-42-1 (1953).
POINT III
THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT ERR IN DENYING AP·
PELLANTS' MOTION FOR MISTRIAL ON THE
PROSECUTOR COMMENTED ON APPELLANTS' FAILUR!
TO TESTIFY, BECAUSE PROSECUTOR MADE NO sucn
COMMENT AND THE COMMENT WHICH PROSECUTOf;
DID MAKE DID NOT PREJUDICE APPELLANTS.

The comment made by prosecutor which
claim is grounds for mistrial was not directed at

13
foilure to testify, but was directed at the right of the state
to j1Ut on witnesses to testify
the defendants! The

prosecutor said:
"l get the impression that the 01.Iy person, the

only complaint, here today is someone has testified
against the defendants, and that's unconstitutional.
That's unAmerican. If you would, that's improper.
If a man is not willing to stand up and testify
as to what he knows, where then is the union?" (Tr.
172, 173).

The United States Supreme Court has held, as appellants indicate, that the Fifth amendment applies to the
states through the Fourteenth amendment and does forbid
"either comment by the prosecution on the accused's silence
or instructions by the Court that i:;uch silence is evidence
of guilt." Griffin v. California, 380 U.S. 609, 615 ( 1965).
That ride was not violated in any manner by the prosecutor
or court below in the case at bar.

n.

y.
RE

:E
Ji

In Chapman ·v. California, 386 U.S. 18 (1967), the
Court dealt with the issue of whether a violation of the
Griff in rule is reversible error. The Court concluded that
not all error-even constitutional C:rror requires reversal of
conviction. A harmless-error test was refined. "[B]efore
a federal constitutional error can be held harmless, the
Court must be able to declare a belief that it was harmless
beyond a reasonable doubt." Id. at 24. The test may be
applied by the court on appeal.
Respondent contends that the comment by the prosecidor did not violate the Griffin rule, because it was not

I l

ut 011 U}J}wlla11is' /a/1111 e to testify. Prosecuton.
not nu .king i·eforc.u:e to ', 11c a1;pell;m'cs, or ariy one else

n <·011111u
1

did not testify. I-12 \\·as me<·ely commeutit1g on the rigr,
for witnesses to come forward and testify against the ,
cused.
1

The jury listened to <:dl the '.1·itnesses, co;:sidercd u.
evidence, and made a decision. Again, no comment 11 ,.
made to the .i ury concernir,g any person \\'ho could h.
testified but did not.
POINT IV
THE APPELLANTS HA VE NOT BEEN DENIED EQU
PROTECTION OF THE LAW ON THE GROUNDS THI.
WERE PROSECUTED AND OTHERS WERE NOT PROSf
UTED, BECAUSE EXERCISE OF SELECTIVITY IN £.\
FORCEMENT NOT DELIBERATELY BASED UPON RMf
RELIGION OR OTHER ARBITRARY CLASSIFICATI0 1
DOES NOT VIOLATE CONSTITUTION.

Where the state fails to prosecute some persons becau'
of lack of knowledge of offenses, and proceeds to prosecu:others, it is not a denial of equal protection of the lai
Furthermore, even ''conscious exercise of some selecti1i'
in enforcement is not in itself a federal constitutional rio!
tion." Oyler 1·. Eo!es, :368 U.S. 448, 456 ( 1962). The Cou:
in Oyler indicated that a deliberate and purposeful selectic
for prosecution based upon race, religion, or other arbitr<11
classification would be denial of equal protection of the l:ir
Such did not ocrur in rnse at bar. Appellants were fou:
guilty of grand larceny; they claim it is unjust to conr
them because others were not charged and tried. "Mt:
failure to prosecute other offenders is no basis for a findi·

lb
of denial of equal protection." Moss v. Hornig, 314 F.2d 89,
92 (2d Cir. 1963).

According to Justice Burger, to treat every offense
and every offender alike, would be an impossible and impractical task for the prosecutor. iV c 1crnan t". United States,
382 F.2d 479 (D.C. Cir. 1967).

No rights of appellants were violated merely because
others were not prosecuted for same offense. State v. Starlight Club, 17 U.2d 174 (1965). Furthermore, the record
fails to reveal that others participated in the crime-larceny
-which appellants are charged with. So, neither the facts
nor the law supports appellants' argument. State v. Washington, ______ U.2d ______ (Case No. 12088, 1970).
CONCLUSION
The appellants were properly convicted. The evidence
was sufficient, the instructions were proper, the prosecutor
made no prejudicial comments, and none of appellants'
constitutional rights were violated.
The conviction should be affirmed.
Respectfully submitted,
VERNON B. ROMNEY
Attorney General
LAUREN N. BEASLEY
Chief Asst. Attorney General

Attorneys for Respondent

